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Arbitration Agreements:
Standard of Review, Interpretation
and Who is Bound
KenAmerican Resources, Inc. v.InternationalUnion, United Mine Workers of
America

I. INTRODUCTION
In KenAmerican Resources, Inc. v. InternationalUnion, United Mine Workers
ofAmerica, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
found that a corporation which did not sign an arbitration agreement entered into by
an individual who owned both that company, KenAmerican Resources, Inc., and the
company that was clearly bound to the arbitration agreement, Ohio Valley
Resources, Inc., was not bound by the arbitration agreement. 2 This was because the
agent who signed the agreement, Robert Murray, was not acting on KenAmerican's
behalf.3

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Robert Murray is the sole owner and served as the President and Chief
Executive Officer of Ohio Valley Resources, Inc., and Coal Resources, Inc.4 Ohio
Valley Resources is the parent company of three other Ohio Valley companies.5 The
International Union, United Mine Workers of America ("the Union") represents the
employees of the Ohio Valley companies. Coal Resources wholly owns seven other
KenAmerican companies including KenAmerican Resources, Inc. ("KRI").7 The
employees of KenAmerican are not members of the Union which represents the
employees of Ohio Valley companies.'
In 1993, after a long strike, the Union and Bituminous Coal Operators
Association, Inc. ("the Association"), a multi-employer bargaining group, which did
not bargain for Ohio Valley companies, reached an agreement ("the Association
Agreement"). 9 One of the concerns discussed during the negotiations was that some

1. 99 F.3d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
2. Id.
3. Id. The unionized Ohio Valley companies were bound by the arbitration agreement because
Robert Murray, the companies' president and chief executive officer, signed the agreement as an agent
on their behalf. The nonunion KenAmerican companies, in which Robert Murray also owns a substantial
share of stock, was not so clearly bound by the agreement. The question of whether KenAmerican was
bound was the subject of the dispute in this case. Id.
4. Id.at 1162.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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companies may operate both union and nonunion mines; this arrangement allowed
the companies to avoid the requirements of previous collective bargaining
agreements by operating nonunion mines.'l The Union was concerned that the effect
of this activity, if continued, would result in the loss of jobs for union employees.
As such, the Union and the Association agreed to limit the use of employees who
were not members of the Union." The Association Agreement included a
Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Job Opportunities ("MOU") under
which "each signatory was to sign as a limited agent of its nonsignatory parent" and
subsidiary operations obligating "those nonunion members of a family corporate
structure to offer three out of every five new classified job openings to qualified laidoff or active miners from the signatory company's bargaining unit."' 2 Furthermore,
the MOU required arbitration of any dispute arising thereunder. 3
The Ohio Valley companies, prior to the Union's strike against the Association,
signed a "me too" agreement with the Union under which the company was required
to adopt any "agreement which came out of the industry-wide negotiations."' 4 After
the Association Agreement had been executed, KRI was incorporated as a subsidiary
of Coal Resources to operate a coal mine."' The resulting jobs were not offered to
Union workers which prompted the Union to claim that KRI "failed to perform its
obligations under the MOU.' 16 As a result, the Union initiated arbitration
proceedings against the Ohio Valley and KenAmerican companies.' 7 The
KenAmerican Companies argued that the Ohio Valley Companies did not represent
the KenAmerican Companies in the negotiations resulting in the agreement and that
Murray, Chief Executive Officer of both corporations, was acting only in his
capacity of Chief Executive Officer of Ohio Valley companies. 8 Therefore, KRI
was not bound by the MOU and was not required to arbitrate the dispute.' 9
The arbitrator, in resolving the question of arbitrability of the dispute, decided
that when Murray signed the agreement as the President of Ohio Valley companies,
he was himself a "parent" and all of his companies, including the KenAmerican
companies, were covered by the MOU.2° As such, the arbitrator required compliance
with the MOU by the KenAmerican Companies.2'
The district court granted summary judgment to the Union enforcing the
arbitration award.22 Murray and the KenAmerican companies appealed, arguing that
they never agreed to be bound to the terms of the MOU. 23 As a result, there was no
agreement between the parties to arbitrate disputes regarding interpretation of the

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

18. Id.
19. Id.

20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1163.
23. Id.
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24
Thus, asserted KenAmerican, the "district [court] judge erroneously
deferred to the arbitrator on the issue of arbitrability."25
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that
federal courts must decide de novo whether parties intended to arbitrate a dispute
unless the parties unmistakably agreed to arbitrate the issue and that the district court
erred in deferring to the arbitrator on the issue of arbitrability and 2in6 determining that
KenAmerican companies and Murray were bound by the MOU.

MOU.

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Standard of Review
The Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") expresses a federal policy favoring
arbitration agreements. 27 The FAA was enacted to ensure that private agreements
to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms.28 Arbitration agreements, like
other contracts, must be intentionally entered into and the interpretation of the terms
and the scope of the agreement is dictated by the intent of the parties upon entering
into the agreement.29 Issues that are to be decided by an arbitrator, rather than a
court, are to be determined by both the contractual intent of the parties upon
executing the arbitration agreement and the terms of the agreement.30 Any conflicts
which arise as to the "arbitrability" of an issue is a question for the courts to decide.3
Courts have interpreted the FAA as accepting the application of contract law
principles to arbitration agreements. 2 Since one generally cannot be held to terms
which were not placed in a contract or agreed to by the parties, a party to an
arbitration agreement cannot be required to submit to the arbitration of any dispute
which he or she has not agreed to submit to arbitration.33
In deciding whether a dispute is one which the parties agreed to arbitrate, the
Supreme Court has held that "unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide
otherwise, the question of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate an issue is to be

24. Id.
25. Id. The second argument put forth by Murray and KenAmerican companies was that the
arbitration agreement, as interpreted by the arbitrator, was unenforceable because it violated § 8(e) of
the National Labor Relations Act. Id. See also 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1994).
26. Idat 1164-1165.
contract evidencing a transaction involving
27. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). "A written provision in...a
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction...
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save on such grounds as exist at law or equity for the
revocation of any contract." Id.
28. See Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University,
489 U.S. 468,479 (1989).
29. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
30. Id.
31. Id. An "arbitrability" issue is a question of whether the arbitration agreement provides that the
dispute is to be settled by arbitration or whether such an interpretation of the agreement would be
contrary to the intent of the parties upon entering the agreement.
32. AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986).
33. Id.
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decided by the court, not the arbitrator."34 The Supreme Court, in later cases,
explained this statement as a limitation on the liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration; however, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be
resolved in favor of arbitration.35 Therefore, if the issue is whether the parties have
agreed to arbitrate a particular procedural or substantive question and the parties
have not clearly expressed an intent for arbitration of such issues, then the issue is
one for the courts to decide.36 However, when an issue is not arbitrability and one
which the parties have clearly intended to arbitrate, the issue is presumptively
arbitrable and is left to the discretion of the arbitrator.37
The issue of what is the appropriate standard of review to be applied to an
arbitrator's decision about arbitrability was addressed by the United States Supreme
Court in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan.38 The Court observed that
although the question is a narrow one, it is one that has certain practical
importance. 9 This is because a party who does not agree to arbitrate is generally
entitled to a court decision on the merits of the dispute, but a party who has agreed
to arbitrate has essentially relinquished the practical value of that right.4"
The Court in Kaplan found that the standard of review to be applied to an
arbitrator's decision as to the arbitrability of a dispute depended on whether the
parties agreed to arbitrate the dispute.41 Therefore, the Court explained, the question
of who has the primary power to decide arbitrability turns on what the parties agreed
about the matter.42 If the parties "clearly and unmistakably" agreed to submit the
arbitrability question itself to arbitration, then, according to the Court, the standard
for reviewing the arbitrator's decision about the matter should not differ from the
standard courts apply when they review any other matter that parties have agreed to
arbitrate. 43 That is, the court should give considerable leeway to the arbitrator and
only set aside his decision in very narrow circumstances.4 If the parties did not
agree to submit the arbitrability question to arbitration, then the court should decide
the question de novo. 45 The Court further explained, in order to decide whether the
parties intended to arbitrate a particular matter, the court should apply general state
contract law principles.46

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,24-25 (1983).
AT&T, 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986).
Id. at 649-650.
514 U.S. 938 (1995).
Id at 942.
Id.
Id. at 943.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 944.
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B. Partiesto the Agreement
An arbitration agreement is a contractual agreement between the parties;
therefore, "a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he
' Although an arbitration agreement may not be read so
has not agreed to submit."47
broadly as to include parties and disputes that were clearly not meant to be a part of
the agreement, "[i]t does not follow, however, that under the [Federal Arbitration]
Act an obligation to arbitrate attaches only to one who has personally signed the
written arbitration provision."4 The Second Circuit has been especially broad in its
application and has held that a nonsignatory may be bound to an arbitration
agreement if so dictated by the ordinary principles of contract and agency law.49 In
Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. American ArbitrationAss 'n., ° the Second Circuit recognized
five traditional bases for binding nonsignatories to arbitration agreements.5'
The first theory recognized in Thomson is that a nonsignatory may be bound
to an arbitration agreement by way of the doctrine of incorporation by reference. 2
This doctrine would likely be applicable when the parties have an existing arbitration
agreement which covers certain areas of disputes, and the parties later enter into a
separate contractual agreement that references the arbitration agreement in a way that
a factual question to
incorporates it into the subsequent contract.53 This is generally
4
be determined by the fact finder in a particular case.
The second basis for binding a nonsignatory party to an arbitration agreement
is by using the conduct of the party to show that they assumed the obligation to
arbitrate.5 The primary question here is whether the parties at any time manifested
an intent to be bound by an arbitration agreement as determined by the party's
actions.56
A third means used by the Second Circuit to bind a nonsignatory party to an
arbitration agreement is through veil piercing/alter ego theory. 7 Under this theory,
the relationship between the parent and subsidiary corporations is considered to
determine if it is sufficiently close so as to hold one legally accountable for the
actions of the other." In Thomson,s9 the court stated that the presence of a corporate
relationship, standing alone, will not suffice to pierce the corporate veil and thereby
allow the court to hold the nonsignatory bound to an arbitration agreement. 60
47. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,582 (1960).
48. Fisser v. International Bank, 282 F.2d 231, 233 (2d Cir. 1960); see also Deloitte Noraudit A/S
v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, 9 F.3d 1060, 1064 (2d Cir. 1993).
49. McAllister Bros., Inc. v. A & S Transp. Co., 621 F.2d 519, 524 (2d Cir. 1980).
50. 64 F.3d 773 (2d Cir. 1995).
51. Id.at 776.
52. Id at 777.
53. Id.
54. See Import Export Steel Corp. v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 351 F.2d 503, 505-06 (2d
Cir. 1965); Matter of Arbitration Between Keystone Shipping Co. and Texport Oil Co., 782 F.Supp. 28,
31 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
55. Thomson, 64 F.3d at 777.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. See also Keystone Shipping, 782 F.Supp. at 30-32.
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Nevertheless, a court will pierce the corporate veil in two situations. First, in order
to prevent fraud on the part of either of the corporations. 6' Second, when the parent
dominates and controls the subsidiary corporation.62 According to the court, one
factor to consider in determining whether a parent corporation dominates or controls
its subsidiary is whether the parent and the subsidiary demonstrate a virtual
abandonment of separateness.63 This may include such things as whether there are
any separate bank accounts and offices, whether the corporations are rn by the same
officers, whether they deal in arms length transactions with each other and whether
they are treated as separate profit centers.'
A final method for holding bound a nonsignatory to an arbitration agreement
is by estoppel. 65 In Deloitte Noraudit A/S v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, 66 a foreign
accounting firm was held bound to an arbitration agreement that was part of a
settlement permitting another accounting firm to use the name "Deloitte". 67 The
court held that by knowingly using the name, and making use of the beneficial parts
of the agreement, the accounting firm was estopped from avoiding the arbitration
clause even though it had never signed the agreement.68

IV. INSTANT DECISION
On appeal, KenAmerican Resources, Inc., offered two arguments to support its
position that it was not bound by the agreement entered into by Robert Murray and
the Union to arbitrate any disputes arising from the Association Agreement, and
specifically, the MOU. 69 KenAmerican's first argument was that it never agreed to
the MOU and the district court judge erroneously gave deference to the arbitrator's
determination that it had.7 ° Its second argument was that the Association Agreement,
as it was interpreted
by the arbitrator, was in violation of the National Labor
71
Relations Act.
The court first discussed the issue of arbitrability of the dispute between the
parties. 7' Relying on AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of
America,7 3' the court observed that the well settled rule in federal courts is that when
deciding issues of arbitrability, the court must decide de novo whether the parties

61. Thomson, 64 F.3d at 777; see also Carte Blanche Pte., Ltd. v. Diners Club Int'l, Inc., 2 F.3d 24,
26 (2d Cir. 1993).
62. Thomson, 64 F.3d at 777.
63. Id.
64. Id. See also Win. Passalacqua Builders, Inc. v. Resnich Developers S., Inc., 933 F.2d 131, 139
(2d Cir. 1991).
65. Thomson, 64 F.3d at 778.
66. 9 F.3d 1060, 1064 (2d Cir. 1993).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. KenAmerican, 99 F.3d at 1163.
70. Id.
71. Id. Specifically, the appellants argued that the arbitrator's interpretation violated § 8(e) of the
National Labor Relations Act.
72. Id.
73. 475 U.S. at 649.
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intended a particular dispute to be arbitrated unless the evidence unmistakably
indicates that the parties intended the particular issue to be decided by the
arbitrator.74 In other words, if the parties are in disagreement as to whether they
have entered into an arbitration agreement at all, then, the issue is to be resolved by
the court without any deference to be given to the view of the arbitrators as to the
arbitrability of the issue.75
The court in KenAmerican found that the parties were not in disagreement as
to the above-stated precedent and rules. 76 The dispute stemmed from the fact that
the district court judge determined that the Ohio Valley companies "clearly and
unmistakably" agreed to submit to binding arbitration any dispute arising out of the
Association Agreement and the MOU. 77 Upon this basis, the district court then gave
"great deference" to the arbitrator's interpretation of the MOU, including the word
'
"parent. 78
From this the district court judge found that KenAmerican was bound by
the arbitration agreement entered into by the Union and Robert Murray.79
The court in this case completely rejected the reasoning of the district court and
its ultimate conclusions."0 This court found that the Ohio Valley companies'
agreement to arbitrate certain disputes in no way indicated that KenAmerican also
agreed to arbitrate similar disputes."' Moreover, the court found that the question of
whether KenAmerican was bound to arbitrate disputes was itself an arbitrability
issue to be decided by the court.8" Therefore, the court determined any deference
given to the arbitrator in making this determination was erroneous.8 3
In determining whether Murray's signing of the agreement bound KenAmerican
to the agreement, the court applied federal common law of contracts.8 4 The Union
argued that KenAmerican was bound by the Association Agreement because Murray
was acting as a principal of KenAmerican and, by signing the agreement on its
behalf, obligated it to conform to the terms of the agreement.8 5 The court focused
on the "me too" agreement entered into in early 1993.86 The court found that the
"me too" agreement, which was very explicit and detailed in its descriptions, covered
Because of the precise and
only the holdings of the Ohio Valley companies.
explicit language used in the Association Agreement, the court determined that no

74. KenAmerican, 99 F.3d at 1163.
75. See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 850 F.2d 756, 761 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(quotingBrotherhood of Teamsters and Auto Truck Drivers Local No. 70 v. Interstate Distributor Co.,
832 F.2d 507, 510 (9th Cir. 1987)); A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc. v. International Union, United Mine
Workers of America, 799 F.2d 142, 146 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1033 (1987).
76. KenAmerican, 99 F.3d at 1163.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1164.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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other companies or entities were intended to be bound by the agreement --especially
Murray personally or the KenAmerican companies.88
Therefore, the court concluded by finding that the district court had erred in
89
deferring to the judgment of the arbitrator as to the arbitrability issue in this case.
Moreover, the court, based on the facts of the case, found that Murray's signing the
Association Agreement in no way bound KenAmerican to the agreement or its
90
obligation to arbitrate disputes arising from it. The court found it sufficient that
Murray took certain actions to modify the MOU and made subsequent modifications
before he signed them to provide that he was acting as a limited agent of the Ohio
Valley Companies. 9'
Because of the court's finding on the arbitrability issue it found it unnecessary
to consider KenAmerican's second argument that9 2 the arbitrator's interpretation of
MOU violated the National Labor Relations Act.

V. COMMENT
Due to the decision in AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers
ofAmerica,93 the correct standard of review and the proper deference to provide the
arbitrator on arbitrability issues were fairly easy to determine and apply to
KenAmerican. Because the issue of this dispute was whether or not KRI was bound
by the arbitration agreement, it is obvious that there is no unmistakable indication
that the parties intended to arbitrate whether or not KRI was a party to the arbitration
agreement.94 The court in this case accurately recognized, unlike the district court,
that the question of whether KenAmerican was bound to the arbitration agreement
was the arbitrability issue in this case, unlike the district court. 95 Because it never
expressly agreed to the MOU, it would be a far stretch to say that it "clearly and
unmistakably" 96 agreed to be bound to the arbitration clause contained therein. As
such, the court's de novo review of the arbitrability issue and its criticism of the
district court's "great deference" to the arbitrator's determinations were logically and
rationally decided.
The court's determination that KenAmerican was not bound by the arbitration
agreement is not nearly as persuasive as it may have been if it had considered more
7
of the factors set out in Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. American ArbitrationAss'n.9 The
court merely applied general contract principles in its determination and declined to
look at other circumstances that may have indicated that it was understood that
KenAmerican was to be bound. The court looked at the terms of the agreement that

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

id.
Idat 1164-65.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1165.
475 U.S. 649.
AT&T Technologies, 475 U.S. at 649.
KenAmerican Resources, Inc., 99 F.3d at 1163.
AT&T Technologies, 475 U.S. at 649.
64 F.3d at 76.
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stated the Ohio Valley Companies were included in the agreement and that
nonsignatories were not to be bound to the agreement. Because nowhere in the
agreement did it state that KRI or Murray himself was bound by the agreement, the
court determined that there was no basis to conclude that they were bound.
Although this might be a rational determination on these facts alone, there were other
factors that, if considered, would have made the case appear less cut and dry.
First, the court failed to take notice of the fact that the MOU stated that each
signatory was to sign as a limited agent of its nonsignatory parent and its
nonsignatory subsidiaries." This phrase alone would appear to indicate that
KenAmerican was intended by the parties to be bound.
The court's analysis and reasoning did not consider many of the factors for
holding a nonsignatory bound to an arbitration agreement as other circuits, especially
the Second Circuit,99 have. For a court to make a full and accurate determination of
whether a party, especially a corporation owned by one of the parties actually
signing the agreement on behalf of another of his corporations, is truly bound to an
arbitration agreement, it is probably necessary to consider more than just the terms
on the face of the agreement.
Although it may be that Murray took great efforts to exclude himself and other
nonsignatories from the arbitration agreement, under the piercing of the veil
approach,'0° the surrounding facts and circumstances may have indicated that, in
fact, and for all objective purposes, he was also acting on behalf of both companies.
The court in this case appeared to give little credence to the fact that Murray was the
chief executive officer of both the Ohio Valley Companies and Coal Resources, Inc.,
which is the parent corporation of KenAmerican Companies and the apparent
authority that comes with his position. The court did not analyze the nature of the
operations of these corporations to determine if, in fact, they were essentially
operating as a single entity. This may have proved fruitful given that all these
companies appear to be operating in the coal industry.'0 ' Furthermore, it is not all
that clear from the facts as presented in the case the KRI was not using Murray to act
on its behalf. The modifications Murray makes to the agreements before signing
them do not explicitly exclude KRI. Given the nature of his relationship with this
company, it is likely that the Union considered KRI in fact to be a signatory to the
agreement. The most blatant and convincing fact that this may have been the case
is that both companies are controlled by the same individual.
Given the broad policy of the FAA favoring arbitration agreements, it appears
that the court
did not give enough consideration to factors outside the written
02
agreement. 1
Although it is not clear which is the best approach, the court's approach of
solely looking at the face of an agreement to determine who is bound could have
serious ramifications if followed widely. Although an entity may not have expressly
intended to be bound by the terms of such an agreement, facts and circumstances

98. KenAmerican, 99 F.3d at 1162.
99. Thomson, 64 F.3d at 776.
100. See supra note 50.
101. Id.
102. See supra note 27.
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outside the agreement may warrant holding them to it. The failure of the court to
consider these surrounding circumstances will likely increase the amount of
litigation by removing the applicability of an arbitration clause. Also, parties that
reasonably rely on an agent's implied authority to act on behalf of another
corporation might find that the agreement they thought they had reached is in fact
meaningless as to particular parties. The court sacrifices broad application of
arbitration agreements for clarity. As a consequence, in a situation such as this one
where one individual has the capacity to represent more than one organization and
there is a question as to who is to be bound, as always, it is best to err on the side of
caution and explicitly state which parties are and are not bound.

VI. CONCLUSION
Although the District of Columbia Circuit has essentially drawn a clear line in
an otherwise potentially muddy landscape, what is not so clear is that this is the best
result. Circumstances other than the terms of the arbitration agreement itself may
indicate that nonsignatories were in fact intended parties to an arbitration agreement.
The court's failure to consider these factors may lead to unnecessarily restrictive
interpretations of arbitration agreements that are not necessarily what the parties
intended.
SHEA WELCH
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